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Abstract 
Scalar implicatures often incur a processing cost in sentence comprehension 
tasks. We used a novel mouse-tracking technique in a sentence verification paradigm to 
test different accounts of this effect. We compared a two-step account, in which people 
access a basic meaning and then enrich the basic meaning to form the scalar 
implicature, against a one-step account, in which the scalar implicature is directly 
incorporated into the sentence representation. Participants read sentences and used a 
computer mouse to indicate whether each sentence was true or false. Three 
experiments found that when verifying sentences like “some elephants are mammals”, 
average mouse paths initially moved towards the true target and then changed direction 
mid-flight to select the false target. This supports the two-step account of implicatures. 
We discuss the results in relation to previous findings on scalar implicatures and 
theoretical accounts of pragmatic inference. 
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To communicate efficiently, speakers often imply information instead of explicitly 
stating it. Consider this exchange: 
1A) Nowadays, teenagers are tethered to their smart phones. 
1B) Some are.  
Here, B is a teenager who distances himself from people of his age who seemingly 
never put down their mobile phones. By saying, “some are,” he confirms that there are 
indeed teenagers who match A’s description. More importantly for the purposes of this 
paper, he also implies that there is a significant group of teenagers who do not use their 
phones excessively.  
In order to understand inferences like those above, the listener must know which of an 
infinite number of potential inferences the speaker intended her to draw. Moreover, for the 
sake of efficiency and communicative fluency, the inferences must be derived in a very short 
space of time. Grice’s (1975; 1989) maxims of communication describe abstract principles 
that could guide the listener in drawing inferences. However, something like Grice’s 
maxims might be realized by any number of processing mechanisms. In this paper, we test 
between two processing models of scalar implicatures (see also, Bott & Noveck, 2004; 
Breheny, Katsos & Williams, 2006; and Huang & Snedeker, 2009). The first model assumes 
the listener derives the implicature in a single processing step - a one-step model - and the 
second assumes the listener initially derives a literal, or basic, meaning, and then enriches 
this to form the implicature - a two step model. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. We first introduce scalar implicatures in more 
detail and present a summary of the relevant linguistic literature. We then present the two 
processing models in more detail and discuss how they account for previous findings on 
processing scalar implicatures. Finally, we introduce the paradigm that we use to test 
between the models and describe three experiments that test the model predictions. 
Scalar implicatures 4 
Scalar implicatures 
The inference in (1) is an example from a broader group of inferences known as scalar 
implicatures (see Geurts, 2010, for a thorough discussion). When B says “Some are,” in (1) 
he implies that not all teenagers use their phones excessively. This inference can be 
described using Grice’s (1975) Cooperative Principle and general reasoning abilities. 
According to the Gricean explanation, the listener first computes some sort of basic meaning 
for what was said (e.g. “at least some…”). This is contrasted with more informative and 
relevant things that the listener could have said instead, if they had been true. For example, 
in (1B) the speaker said, “some are,” but he could have said, “all are”, which would have 
been more informative and relevant. Relying on the Cooperative Principle, the listener 
assumes that the speaker would have used the more informative statement if it were true. 
Because the speaker did not, the listener infers that all must not hold. Finally, by combining 
what the speaker said, “some are,” with the not all inference, the listener arrives at the final 
interpretation, some but not all are.  
In general, scalar implicatures occur when a speaker uses a weak element from a scale 
of elements ordered in terms of semantic strength (a semantic or Horn scale; see Horn, 1972, 
1989). Under these circumstances the listener is licensed to infer that the stronger elements 
in the scale do not hold. For example, some, many, all, form a semantic scale, some <many 
<all, with all being the strongest, most informative element (whenever all X is true, some X 
and many X are also true, but not the reverse). Use of some can therefore imply the negation 
of many and all. Other examples of semantic scales and their associated implicatures 
include, may < must, where the use of may can imply not must; or < and, where or can 
imply not and, and warm < hot, where warm implies not hot. Indeed, any set of elements 
can become part of a semantic scale and generate scalar implicatures in a suitable context, as 
in the scale, handsome < handsome and intelligent, that arises from speaker A saying, 
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“John’s handsome and intelligent” and speaker B responding with, “Well, he’s handsome,” 
(see Carston, 1998). As with other pragmatic phenomena, scalar implicatures are defeasible, 
or cancellable (e.g., “some are… in fact all of them are.”). Defeasibility distinguishes scalar 
implicatures from entailments, but unlike other pragmatic phenomena, scalar implicatures 
often occur in very structured semantic environments (see e.g., Chierchia, 2004). For 
example, scalar implicatures do not arise when used in the antecedent of the conditional (“If 
some of the children are in the classroom,…”), and they interact systematically with 
negation, such as the some implication that arises when a speaker says not all, as in “Not all 
of the children are in the classroom.” Thus scalar implicatures involve interactions between 
semantic and pragmatic considerations, providing a unique domain in which to employ 
insights from two often separate disciplines of study (see Horn, 2006, “The border wars”).  
In psycholinguistic investigations of how scalar implicatures are processed, most work 
has considered a processing adaptation of Neo-Gricean theory (e.g., Gazdar, 1979; 
Levinson, 2000), known as the default model. According to Levinson, for example, 
quantificational determiners such as some are associated with alternative constructions in 
memory (e.g., all and many). The contrast between the expression used (e.g. “some”) and an 
alternative construction that was not used automatically leads to the implicature (e.g., not 
all). In the processing literature this has been taken to mean that scalar implicatures should 
arise on every occasion in which a scalar term occurs, but that subsequently the implicature 
is sometimes cancelled (e.g., Bott & Noveck, 2004; Breheny, Katsos & Williams, 2006; 
Huang & Snedeker, 2009). In other words, the implicature arises by default. Although this 
work is important, and we discuss it in more detail below, our approach to processing of 
scalar implicatures takes a different tack. Instead of asking whether the implicature is 
derived by default even when it is not required, we ask how that derivation takes place: does 
deriving an implicature involve a single processing step, or are there multiple steps?  
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One-step vs two-step processing models 
We suggest a distinction between, on the one hand, computing a basic meaning and 
then enriching it to form a different meaning, and on the other, computing the completed 
meaning in a single processing step. We refer to the former as two-step models, and the 
latter as one-step models.  
Two-step models are those in which an initial semantic interpretation forms a basis 
from which a distinctly different meaning is eventually derived. Several different theories 
are possible; the most obvious being a processing version of a Gricean account. Under this 
view, a listener must first compute the literal meaning of the sentence and its possible 
alternatives (Step 1), and then, assuming the speaker is informative and reliable, the listener 
enriches the literal meaning with the implicature (Step 2). The output of Step 1 is necessary 
to execute Step 2. Alternatively, the default implicature model (as described above), in 
which the implicature is always derived but sometimes cancelled, is also an example of a 
two-step model, albeit with Step 1 corresponding to the implicature and Step 2, after 
cancelling, corresponding to the literal meaning. Other examples include a model in which 
the decision to proceed onto Step 2 processing is not contingent on the output of Step 1 but 
nonetheless automatically follows it. The common theme running through two-step models 
is that some form of meaning is used as a basis to derive a different, second meaning. 
One-step models, on the other hand, do not assume multiple, sequential processing 
steps. Necessary computations can be made in parallel and the appropriate scalar 
interpretation can be incorporated into the sentence in a single processing step, rather like 
constraint-based models of processing in which contextual, grammatical and other factors 
are all computed in parallel to provide the best guess at the appropriate interpretation (e.g., 
Bates & MacWhinney, 1989; MacDonald, Pearlmutter & Seidenberg, 1994; van Gompel, 
Pickering, Pearson, & Liversedge, 2005; and Degen & Tanenhaus, 2011, who explicitly 
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propose a model of this sort for scalar implicatures). One-step models can be conceptualized 
by assuming that each scalar interpretation (the literal meaning and the implicature) has an 
activation level, determined by the context, and the interpretation with the highest activation 
is incorporated into the sentence. For example, consider the difference between some and 
some of. The increased likelihood of an implicature interpretation for some of compared to 
some (Grodner, Klein, Carbary, & Tanenhaus, 2010) could be explained by supposing that 
the presence of the partitive of increases activation levels of the implicature interpretation. 
Conversely, expressions that appear to block scalar implicatures, such as if (Chierchia, 2004) 
or not (Gazdar, 1979), could decrease the activation levels. In principle, there are many ways 
that implicatures could be derived by different one-step models. Scalar interpretations might 
be stored directly in the lexicon, for example, or procedures for deriving the upper-bound 
interpretation1 might be precompiled and triggered when necessary (along the lines of 
Chierchia, 2004, 2006). The common theme in one-step models is that multiple 
interpretations are not accessed in sequence: a single meaning is selected, either upper- or 
lower-bound, and incorporated directly into the sentence representation. 
The work presented in this paper tests between these two accounts. Before describing 
our experiments, however, we review the previous literature on scalar implicature 
processing and illustrate how the models above account for those findings. 
Processing scalar implicatures 
A growing body of evidence suggests that sentences with scalar implicatures incur 
processing costs. Upper-bound interpretations, such as some [but not all], have long 
response latencies relative to lower-bound interpretations, such as some [and possibly all], in 
                                       
1 We refer to scalar sentences as having upper-bound meanings when they have some but 
not all interpretations, and lower-bound meanings when they have the literal meaning, or 
some and possibly all interpretations, consistent with Brehney et al., (2006). The 
terminology refers to the scale having a bounded meaning at the upper end of the semantic 
scale in the implicature case (something less than all).  
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sentence verification tasks (Bott & Noveck, 2004), and longer reading times (Breheny et al., 
2006; Bergen & Grodner, 2012). They show delayed onset of above-chance accuracy in 
sentence verification tasks with response deadlines (Bott et al., 2012), and delayed eye 
fixations in a visual world task (Huang & Snedeker, 2009; but see Grodner, et al., 2010). As 
we shall see, one-step and two-step models both account for these findings but in different 
ways. In our review of the literature, we start with a discussion of Bott and Noveck, whose 
methodology forms the basis of this study, and we also consider the visual world studies, 
which have found mixed evidence for the cost of implicatures.  
Bott and Noveck (2004) argued that according to the default model, the time needed to 
derive a scalar implicature will always be less than the time needed to derive the literal 
meaning (see also Noveck & Posada, 2003). They trained participants to respond either true 
or false to underinformative sentences such as some elephants are mammals. These 
sentences were ambiguous in that they were true if participants derived the lower-bound 
meaning of the scalar term, as in, some [and possibly all] elephants are mammals, but false 
if participants derived the upper-bound meaning, as in, some [but not all] elephants are 
mammals. Bott and Noveck found that upper-bound interpretations (false) were slower than 
lower-bound interpretations (true) for the experimental sentences, yet there was very little 
difference between comparable true and false control sentences. Indeed, lower-bound 
interpretations were processed at the same speed as true control sentences. In another 
experiment, Bott and Noveck reversed the mapping between the true and false response 
options and the upper and lower-bound interpretations, and found that the upper-bound 
interpretations were slow even when upper-bound interpretations were associated with true 
responses. Bott and Noveck therefore concluded that there was a cost to deriving scalar 
implicatures that did not apply to interpretations without the implicatures, and that, 
consequently, scalar implicatures were not computed by default. 
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Bott et al. (2012) adapted Bott and Noveck’s (2004) sentence verification task, using a 
response deadline procedure to eliminate the possibility of speed-accuracy trade-off effects 
(see Reed, 1973; McElree, 1993). More processing time was required to achieve above-
chance accuracy for upper-bound interpretations than for lower-bound interpretations, 
consistent with Bott and Noveck’s study. Bott et al. also found that participants were faster 
to correctly respond to only some sentences (only some elephants are mammals) than to 
equivalent upper-bound some (some [but not all] elephants are mammals). They concluded 
that implicatures incur additional costs that are likely to reflect some form of pragmatic 
enrichment applied to a prior literal meaning to derive the upper-bound interpretation. An 
interesting alternative explanation, however, concerns the focusing properties of only. If 
only focuses attention on the complement set (e.g., elephants who are not mammals), 
whereas upper-bound some [but not all] focuses on the referent set (elephants that are 
mammals), participants in Bott et al. (2012) might have found it easier to reject the only 
statements than the plain some statements. Some intuitive evidence for this is given by 
consideration of sentences like only some elephants are cars, which are false, but appear 
more difficult to reject than sentences like some elephants are cars, which are also false. 
The focusing properties of only might explain this difference. In short, while Bott et al., 
present suggestive evidence that part of the cost observed by Bott and Noveck (2004) was 
due to pragmatic enrichment, there might be other, non-pragmatic explanations for the Bott 
et al. only results. 
Sentence verification tasks have found a cost to scalar implicatures, as have sentence 
reading studies (Breheny et al., 2006; Bergen & Grodner, 2012). Visual world studies 
present a more varied picture, however. Consistent with sentence verification results, Huang 
and Snedeker (2009) found that looking times to a referent were delayed when participants 
needed to form a scalar implicature, relative to a control quantifier. Participants saw a 
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display of four images and heard sentences instructing them to click on one of them. The 
images consisted of characters with a variety of objects. In the critical trials, one of the 
characters (e.g., a girl) had a subset of one item (e.g., some of the socks), another character 
(a boy) had a subset of those same items (socks), and third and fourth characters had sets of 
other items. The participant heard sentences like, “Click on the girl with [quantifier] of the 
socks.” The quantifier was either the scalar term, some, or a control quantifier, such as two 
or all. Huang and Snedeker found that eye fixations to the target image were delayed when 
the quantifier was upper-bound some compared to the control quantifiers. They argued that 
this delay was because the participant needed to compute an implicature in the some case, 
but not for the other quantifiers.  
A similar visual world study, however, by Grodner et al. (2010), failed to observe 
delayed looking times for upper-bound some. Grodner et al. suggested several differences in 
procedure that might explain the discrepancy. For example, they equated target image size 
across conditions so that delays in the some condition could not be explained by preferential 
looking to the larger image (in Huang and Snedeker’s, 2009, study, the all conditions 
involved larger images). One particularly important difference was the presence of more apt 
amount descriptors (two and three) in the filler items of Huang and Snedeker, but not in 
Grodner et al. Participants in Huang and Snedeker’s study might therefore have encoded the 
target images using the numerical quantifiers, such as, the girl with two of the socks, and 
then experienced difficulty relating the target sentence, the girl with some of the socks, back 
to their encoded image. The delay observed by Huang and Snedeker might therefore be 
explained by a mismatch between the way in which images were encoded and the target 
sentence (see Degen & Tanenhaus, 2011 and Grodner et al.). Grodner et al. concluded that 
there might be contexts in which there is no cost to scalar implicatures, or that the cost in 
referential paradigms is much smaller than previously thought (100ms or less).  
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The studies reviewed above suggest that interpreting a sentence with a scalar 
implicature carries a cost, on at least some occasions. The studies that directly compared 
upper-bound with lower-bound interpretations all found that upper-bound interpretations 
required more processing time than the lower-bound interpretation. Comparisons between 
upper-bound some and other quantifiers have produced mixed results, but none of the 
studies found an advantage in processing time for upper-bound interpretations.  
The one-step and the two-step models described above can both explain costs 
associated with scalar implicatures, suggesting that interpretation time is not sufficient to 
distinguish between them. First consider two-step models. These assume that the listener 
initially computes some form of basic meaning, and then enriches this meaning to derive an 
implicature. Two-step models therefore predict that there is an extra processing step required 
in deriving the upper-bound relative to the lower-bound meaning. The extra step causes the 
processing cost observed by Bott and Noveck (2004) and others. One-step models, however, 
clearly cannot explain the cost to deriving the implicature by appealing to a different number 
of steps across interpretations. Nonetheless, there are general complexity differences across 
sentence forms that would suggest delays even without an extra step in the processing. For 
example, upper-bound sentences require dividing the subject set into a reference and a 
complement set (e.g., elephants that are mammals vs. those that are not mammals), whereas 
lower-bound sentences only require a reference set (see Grodner, Gibson & Watson, 2005, 
for evidence of additional processing cost when a reader must instantiate a complement set 
in addition to a reference set). Also, upper-bound sentences involve negation whereas lower-
bound sentences do not, and processing negation may cause difficulty (see Clark & Chase, 
1972). Finally, upper-bound sentences contain more information than lower-bound 
sentences (upper-bound sentences logically entail lower-bound sentences, but not vice 
versa), and their interpretation might therefore require more computation. According to one-
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step models, composition and comprehension processes are more complex for the upper-
bound meaning, and processing the upper-bound sentence is therefore more time-
consuming.  
While both types of models predict delayed scalar implicatures, they make different 
claims about a participant’s reasoning prior to the completed response. Two-step models 
propose that participants pass through a step in which they first access the lower-bound 
interpretation before enriching it to form the upper-bound, but one-step models maintain that 
participants will directly incorporate the upper-bound interpretation into the sentence 
representation. This paper presents the results of three sentence verification tasks that used a 
mouse-tracking paradigm to test between these models. The mouse trajectories provide vital 
information about participants’ reasoning prior to their final response in a way that would 
not be observable with reaction times alone. As we explain in Experiment 1, the mouse path 
predictions are different for the one-step and two-step models. 
Mouse tracking  
Mouse-tracking has been used successfully to investigate a broad range of phenomena 
in domains as diverse as phonetics (Spivey, Grosjean, & Knoblich, 2005), syntactic 
processing (Farmer, Anderson & Spivey, 2007), social cognition (Freeman & Ambady, 
2010), and lie detection (Duran, Dale, & McNamara, 2010). See Freeman, Dale and Farmer 
(2011), for a review. Participants’ mouse movements during responses reveal that attentional 
processes and decision-making processes are not mutually exclusive and distinct; rather 
motor movements demonstrate online integration of both at their earliest steps of processing 
(Spivey, 2007). 
In a typical mouse tracking experiment the cursor starts at the bottom of the screen in 
the center, with two response options placed in the top left and right corners—perhaps two 
pictures, or true and false response options (see Figure 1). The participant hears or sees a 
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sentence, then uses a mouse to move the cursor and click on the target response. The 
directness of the mouse trajectory from the bottom of the screen to the target provides 
information about the underlying cognitive processes of the formulation and selection of a 
response. When participants are immediately confident of their response, mouse paths depart 
early from the central axis and progress directly to the target, as indicated by the idealized 
solid line trajectory in Figure 1. Conversely, when participants have difficulty and/or are 
oscillating between two responses, they generally hover around or move the mouse up the 
center of the screen for a longer period resulting in a less direct mouse trajectory towards the 
target, as indicated by the idealized dotted line trajectory in Figure 1 (e.g. Spivey et al. 
2005). In contrast, if participants initially consider one option before ultimately selecting the 
other, mouse paths initially head away from the ultimate target, as indicated by the dash-dot 
trajectory in Figure 1 (e.g., Dale & Duran, 2011). Thus the mouse path provides information 
about the interpretation processes that occur prior to the completed interpretation (the 
ultimate response).  
_________________________________________ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
_________________________________________ 
The qualitatively different mouse tracks in Figure 1 can be usefully characterized in 
terms of two quantitative measures, area under the curve (AUC) and horizontal deviation 
towards the competitor response (Xneg). AUC measures the geometric area between the 
actual trajectory and a straight line between the trajectory’s start and end points. Mouse 
paths that deviate far from the shortest path will have a large AUC. AUC is thought to 
provide a general measure of processing difficulty (Freeman & Ambady, 2010), and the 
more difficult the task the greater AUC (Farmer, Anderson, & Spivey, 2007; Freeman, 
Ambady, Rule, & Johnson, 2008). Xneg measures deviation away from the medial axis 
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towards the competitor response. A large Xneg indicates that the participant strayed far into 
competitor space. We report AUC and Xneg in our experiments. AUC allows our results to 
be compared with other mouse tracking experiments and Xneg provides a means of 
distinguishing between one-step and two-step processing models, as we describe below 
(further explanation of the difference between AUC and Xneg can be seen in Figure 1).  
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 compared lower-bound and upper-bound interpretations of sentences 
like some elephants are mammals. Participants read propositional statements modified by 
some or all, and decided whether each sentence was true or false. Participants classified six 
types of sentences, including the critical sentences, such as some elephants are mammals, 
and five types of control sentences. Critical sentences were true if responses were based on 
the lower-bound meaning and false if their responses were based on the upper-bound 
meaning. The five control sentence types were the same as those of Bott et al. (2012), and 
were designed so that participants could not predict whether the sentence was going to be 
true or false from the quantifier-subject relationship (see Table 1 for a complete list of 
sentence types). For example, on reading some elephants are…, participants were not able to 
predict the truth of the sentence before the final word, because some completions made the 
sentence true (e.g., Indian), while other completions made the sentence false (e.g., insects). 
Statements were presented one word at a time, and participants were free to move the mouse 
when the final word was presented. Responses were made by clicking on “T” (true) or “F” 
(false) targets at the top two corners of the screen. 
We wanted to compare upper and lower-bound mouse paths for the critical sentences. 
We therefore introduced a training phase at the start of the experiment that biased 
participants into understanding the critical sentences according to one interpretation or the 
other (see Bott & Noveck, 2004, Experiment 1; and Rips, 1975). In the logical condition, 
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participants received feedback encouraging a lower-bound, logical interpretation (a true 
response). In the pragmatic condition, feedback encouraged an upper-bound, pragmatic 
interpretation (a false response). Thus, participants in the logical condition received a 
message reading “correct” when they responded true to the some critical sentences, and a 
message reading “incorrect” when they responded false. Participants in the pragmatic 
condition received the reverse response mapping feedback. Participants also received 
feedback on the control sentences, which was the same for all participants. After the training 
phase, participants judged the truth of similar test sentences, but did not receive feedback. 
Predictions for the models are as follows (see Figure 1). Because previous studies have 
found lower-bound interpretations to be relatively fast, we predicted that participants in the 
logical condition would, on average, move the mouse directly to the target when responding 
to the critical sentences, as in the “one step – easy” mouse path in Figure 1. In contrast, 
previous studies have found upper-bound interpretations to be relatively slow. According to 
one-step models, the delay in processing upper-bound sentences is caused by extra 
composition and comprehension processes, such as needing to form a complement set, 
process the negation, and verify the additional information. Participants in the pragmatic 
condition would therefore require more time to come to a decision about whether the 
sentence is true or false. In mouse tracking terms, they should therefore move their mouse 
further up the vertical axis before deviating towards the target response (as in the “one step – 
hard” mouse path in Figure 1). According to one-step models, AUC for critical sentences 
should be larger for participants in the pragmatic condition than the logical condition, but 
Xneg should be near zero for both groups of participants. In contrast, according to two-step 
models, interpretations of the upper-bound sentence involve first accessing the lower-bound 
meaning before the completed implicature. Average mouse trajectories should therefore first 
move towards lower-bound targets (true) and then shift towards upper-bound targets (false) 
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in a secondary step (as in the “two step” mouse paths in Figure 1). According to two-step 
models, AUC may or may not be greater for upper-bound than lower-bound interpretations; 
however, if mouse trajectories are sensitive to the initial representations in a two-step 
process, then Xneg should be larger for upper-bound than lower-bound interpretations.   
Method 
Participants. Forty Cardiff University psychology students participated for course 
credit. All were native speakers of English. 
Stimuli. Sentences frames were of the form “Quantifier X are Y”. The quantifier was 
either all or some, and X and Y were either exemplars or categories, depending on the 
sentence type. Sentences were generated from 18 categories (e.g., mammals, insects, cars) 
and 30 exemplars (e.g., cows, bees, Ferraris). Experiment 1 used six different sentence 
types, as shown in Table 1. Appendix 1 shows a complete list of stimuli. 
Design. Participants were presented with a biasing context that encouraged either an 
upper-bound or a lower-bound interpretation. The context consisted of a training phase in 
which feedback (“correct” or “incorrect”) was given to reinforce either the upper-bound or 
lower-bound interpretations of some. Feedback was also given for the control sentences. 
Participants were randomly allocated to a pragmatic condition or a logical condition. No 
feedback was given in the experimental phase. 
The training phase involved 100 sentences, 25 of which were critical items along with 
15 some true items, 15 some subordinate true items, 15 some false items, 15 all false items, 
and 15 all true items. These items were different from the items used in the main experiment 
and were not rotated across conditions.  
Each item for the test phase was formed by using an exemplar, e.g., “elephants”, in 
one of six versions corresponding to the six sentence types above. Participants saw each 
exemplar in all six sentence types. In total, there were 30 exemplars by 6 conditions, making 
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180 sentences in the test phase. Sentences were presented in a different random order for 
each participant.  
True and false response boxes (labeled “T” and “F”) were presented at the top-left or 
top-right of the screen. Positioning of the response boxes was counterbalanced across 
participants but the same configuration was used throughout the experiment.  
Procedure and equipment. The MouseTracker software (Freeman & Ambady, 2010) 
was used to run all of the experiments reported in this paper. We used standard monitors 
measuring 35 by 25 cm, and normal, laser mice with no mousepad. The start box was placed 
at the bottom center of the screen and measured 2 x 5 cm. The two response boxes we 
located at top left and top right corners of the screen at a distance of 1 cm from the edges. 
Both responses boxes measured 5 x 5 cm. The linear distance from the starting position of 
the cursor arrow in the middle of the start box to the edge of a response box measured 22 
cm. The distance moved by the participant’s hand to select a response was approximately 17 
cm. 
Participants were told to evaluate the truth of statements by clicking on the response 
boxes. They were also told to ask for clarification if they received feedback for a trial that 
did not make sense (although no participant did). No specific instructions were given about 
upper or lower-bound interpretations of the scalar term (cf. Bott & Noveck, 2004).  
Participants started the trial by clicking on the start box at the bottom center of the 
screen. Sentences were presented word by word in the middle of the screen at a rate of 
300ms per word. Mouse tracking began at the onset of the final word in the sentence. If 
participants had not initiated any mouse movement within 500ms of the final word, they 
received a warning telling them to respond more quickly.  
Results 
Preprocessing 
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For all of the experiments presented in this study, responses were considered outliers if 
mouse trajectories were three standard deviations outside of the mean AUC of all responses. 
We also removed incorrect responses from all conditions. In Experiment 1, 1.5% of 
responses were excluded as outliers and 7% as incorrect responses. Less than 1% of 
responses had initiation times greater than 500ms. These responses were also removed. 
To compare the mouse movements of responses with different response times, for 
example a 900ms response versus a 1200ms response, we normalized the time course of the 
mouse paths into 101 time steps, as is standard in mouse tracking (Freeman & Ambady, 
2010). The time steps also provide a rough space of potential areas of processing during the 
response: response initiation stages (time steps 1-25), early/middle stages (time steps 26-50), 
middle/late stages (time steps 51-75), and late stages (time steps 76-101). In general, the 
majority of response initiation stages cluster around the start button, that is participants 
rarely initiate their response in the first few time steps, and the majority of time steps in the 
late stages cluster around the response button because participants generally stop moving the 
mouse before initiating a click. The horizontal coordinates corresponding to each time 
quadrant and each condition are shown in Appendix 2.  
At each time step the position of the mouse was represented by (X, Y) coordinates, 
with X ranging from -1 to 1 and Y ranging from 0 to 1.5. This 2 x 1.5 rectangle roughly 
corresponds to classical CRT monitors and facilitates comparisons across different screen 
resolutions. The Analyser program in the MouseTracker suite (Freeman & Ambady, 2010) 
was used to perform the normalization.   
Mouse tracking analysis 
Figures 2 and 3 display average mouse paths for participants in the logical and 
pragmatic conditions respectively, collapsed across the counterbalanced right and left 
positions of the targets. Mouse paths for the critical sentences are shown by the dark crosses. 
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In the logical condition the critical sentences were true, and the mouse paths display a 
simple arc towards the true target. Conversely, the critical sentences for the pragmatic 
condition were false. Here, however, the mouse paths deviate substantially towards the true 
target before crossing back over the medial axis towards false. While several types of 
control sentences deviate slightly towards the competitor before returning to the correct 
target, such as the some subordinate true sentences in Figure 3, these deviations appear 
much smaller and occur earlier in the paths than the deviation for the upper-bound 
sentences. In general, all control trajectories shift towards false in the pragmatic compared to 
the logical condition, consistent with the shift in overall proportions of false versus true 
responses in the two conditions. 
_________________________________________ 
Insert Figures 2 & 3 about here 
_________________________________________ 
Mean accuracy, AUC, and reaction times are shown in Table 2. Mean AUC scores for 
true control sentences were all higher in the pragmatic condition than the logical condition, 
while false sentences exhibited the opposite pattern. AUC scores for critical sentences were 
higher in the pragmatic condition than in the logical condition. The effect of training 
condition on AUC scores for critical sentences was assessed by fitting a linear mixed-effects 
regression model (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008) with sentence type (some critical, 
some false, some subordinate true, some true, all false, all true) and training (pragmatic vs. 
logical) as categorical fixed effects, along with the interaction between these two variables. 
The variables were dummy coded so that some critical sentences in the pragmatic condition 
functioned as a baseline, and the “main effect” of training measured the difference between 
some critical sentences in the pragmatic and logical conditions. Random effects were 
included for subjects and items. A Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method was used 
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to obtain p-values for fixed effects as recommended by Baayen et al. AUC scores for critical 
sentences were significantly greater for the upper-bound interpretations of the pragmatic 
condition than for the lower-bound interpretations of the logical condition, t = 17.79, p < 
.001, suggesting greater overall difficulty for upper-bound interpretations.  
_________________________________________ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
_________________________________________ 
We also analysed the x-coordinates to establish whether participants deviated into the 
competitor half of the trajectory, that is, whether there was a significant Xneg. For each 
condition, we calculated the mean deviation into competitor space at each time point. Next, 
we found the time point with the maximum deviation and tested whether it was significantly 
different from zero, using both participant and item variability. For pragmatic participants, 
the largest mean deviation for the critical sentences, i.e., the largest Xneg, occurred at time 
step X_43, and had x-coordinate M = -.24. A one sample t-test showed that this was 
significantly different from zero for participants, t1(19) = 6.03, p < 0.001, and items, t2(29) = 
9.98, p < 0.001. In contrast, there were no Xneg scores for the critical sentences in the 
logical condition (i.e., the mean trajectory for the logical sentences did not cross into the 
competitor half of the space).  
Several of the control sentences also displayed deviations into the competitor space. 
Specifically, all false and some false in the logical condition and some subordinate true in 
the pragmatic condition. These deviations were smaller than those associated with the 
critical sentences, all t1(19) < 3.06, p’s < .001, all t2(29)’s > 3.44, p’s < .001, and they 
occurred much earlier in the trajectory: the control deviations occurred at X_23, X_25, and 
at X_28, whereas the critical deviations occurred at X_43. These effects are discussed 
below. 
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Discussion 
Mouse paths for the upper-bound interpretations of critical sentences deviated towards 
the competitor response (true) prior to the correct response (false). No such deviation, 
however, was observed for lower-bound interpretations. Initially, average mouse trajectories 
for upper-bound responses were reliably heading towards true and only later corrected 
towards false. Because participants initially moved their mouse movements towards true, 
this strongly suggests that a lower-bound meaning was active early, and the upper-bound 
meaning was activated relatively late in processing. These results are consistent with two-
step models, in which participants begin with a lower-bound interpretation and only 
subsequently derive an upper-bound interpretation for the critical sentences. The results are 
not consistent with one-step models, which predict monotonic trajectories in the direction of 
false responses for upper-bound interpretations.  
We also observed some small and early deviations into the competitor space for some 
of the control sentences. Our view is that these were due to response biases caused by an 
imbalance in the ratio of true to false responding in the training phase. In the logical 
condition, there was a predominance of true sentences overall, hence participants displayed 
negative mouse paths whenever they responded false. In the pragmatic condition, while 
there was a more equal ratio of true to false sentences overall, sentences that involved some 
and a subordinate item (e.g., elephants) were predominantly false, hence there were initial 
trajectories towards false. Furthermore, to foreshadow the results of Experiment 2, we do 
not replicate the negative trajectories when we reduced the imbalance in true/false 
responding. 
In this study, participants were trained to respond to the critical sentences in a 
particular way. It is conceivable that participants might ordinarily be inclined to respond true 
to our experimental sentences, but in the pragmatic condition they responded false in order 
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to conform to the experimental demands introduced by the feedback during the training 
phase. This could explain an initial deviation towards the true response, followed by a later, 
metalinguistic deviation towards false. In order to test the possibility that our results were an 
artifact of task demands, we repeated Experiment 1 but without training participants to 
respond a particular way to critical sentences. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 compared lower-bound and upper-bound interpretations of sentences in 
an unbiased context. Participants had to verify categorical sentences, just as they did in 
Experiment 1, but they did not receive feedback on their responses to the critical sentences. 
There were therefore no experimenter demands to make false responses to the critical 
sentences and participants could respond with their most natural interpretation. Participants 
underwent a practice phase, just as they did in Experiment 1, but critical sentences were not 
presented. 
We introduced one further change in this experiment relative to Experiment 1. In 
Experiment 1, there were three true control sentences and two false control sentences. This 
meant that there was a response bias towards true responding, especially in the logical 
condition after training. While it is unlikely that response biases could explain the 
trajectories that we observed in Experiment 1 for critical sentences (the effects on critical 
sentences were later and stronger than those apparently associated with response biases for 
control sentences), we wanted to eliminate this possibility. We therefore replaced one of the 
true control sentences, some subordinate true, with another false control condition, all super 
false, such as all mammals are elephants (this meant that the control sentences we used were 
identical in form to those of Bott & Noveck, 2004). See Table 1 for a complete list of 
sentence types. We also adjusted the proportions of the sentences assigned to each condition 
so that there was an equal ratio of true to false items overall (100 trials in the practice phase, 
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50:50 true:false). The ratio of true to false was also balanced within each quantifier so that 
there was an approximately equal ratio within some sentences (25:20) and within all 
sentences (25:30). The critical sentences were not included in these calculations because 
participants were free to choose which interpretation they preferred.  
Method 
Participants. Thirty-two undergraduate students from Cardiff University participated 
in Experiment 2 in exchange for cash payment. All were native speakers of English. 
Stimuli. We used the same stimuli base as Experiment 1, but changed one of the six 
sentence types. See Table 1 for a list of sentence types and examples. 
Design. All participants underwent a practice phase of 100 trials. These trials consisted 
of 15 all super false sentences, 25 some true sentences, 20 some false sentences, 15 all false 
sentences, and 25 all true sentences. The breakdown was done in this way to ensure that 
each quantifier had roughly an equal chance of being true or false. No critical sentences 
were included in the practice session. 
The main experiment contained 180 trials. There were six conditions and all 
conditions had an equal number of trials. Thirty exemplars were selected equally across 
different category types and participants were presented with the six different sentence types 
built around each exemplar (see Appendix 1). Participants did not receive any feedback 
during the main experiment.  
Procedure. The experimental procedure was the same as Experiment 1, although 
participants were not trained on critical items.  
Results 
Preprocessing 
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We removed 1.8% of the responses as outliers. A further 3% incorrect responses were 
removed from the control conditions. Less than 1% of the responses had initiation times 
greater than 500ms.  
Accuracy 
Accuracy rates are shown in Table 3. Participants answered the control questions 
extremely accurately, as they did in Experiment 1. For the critical sentences, participants 
responded with a slight bias towards upper-bound interpretations (false) but the sample still 
generated a high proportion of lower-bound responses. Overall the accuracy rates are similar 
to Bott and Noveck (2004; Experiment 3), who also observed a 59% upper-bound response 
rate. 
_________________________________________ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
_________________________________________ 
Mouse tracking analysis 
Figure 4 shows the average mouse trajectories for the false and true responses 
respectively, collapsed across the counterbalanced right and left positions of the targets. For 
the critical sentences, the data are the average mouse paths of all the responses to false 
(upper-bound interpretation) or true (lower-bound interpretation), independently of which 
participants made which responses. For the control sentences, the data show the average of 
the correct responses only. The pattern is very similar to the results of Experiment 1: Upper-
bound responses deviate towards the competitor response, whereas lower-bound responses 
do not.  
_________________________________________ 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
_________________________________________ 
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Mean accuracy, AUC, and reaction times are shown in Table 3. AUC scores varied 
across the various sentence types, and on critical sentences the AUC scores were higher for 
false (upper-bound) responses than true (lower-bound). We analysed AUC scores using a 
repeated measures, mixed model design. Categorical fixed effects were quantifier (all, some 
control, some critical), and response (true, false), along with the interaction between these 
two variables. Sentence type was entered as a single categorical fixed effect with the seven 
levels shown in Figure 4, including separate levels for true and false responses to some 
critical sentences. Sentence type was dummy coded with pragmatic responses to some 
critical sentences serving as a baseline. Random effects were included for subjects and 
items. AUC was significantly greater for upper-bound than lower-bound interpretations, t = 
11.40, p < .001, again suggesting greater deviation for upper-bound interpretations. 
In the analysis of Xneg, for the upper-bound (false) responses, the largest negative 
deviation was at time step X_41, M = -.27, which was significantly different to zero, t1(28) = 
3.78, p < 0.001, t2(29) = 6.99, p < 0.001. The data from 3 participants were not included in 
this analysis because they responded true to all of the critical sentences. There were no 
deviations into the competitor space for the lower-bound (true) responses.  
One potential concern with the repeated measures analysis is that it includes 
participants who might be very unsure of their responses. Participants who are unsure may 
deviate towards either of the response options prior to the final decision. This effect may be 
much greater for upper-bound responses (false) because participants could have a general 
response bias towards true. To eliminate this explanation of our findings, we divided 
participants into logical responders and pragmatic responders depending on whether the 
majority of their responses (65%) were lower-bound (logical) or upper-bound (pragmatic). 
This generated two groups of participants who were relatively confident about their 
responses and on which we could conduct an analysis similar to that of Experiment 1. 
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_________________________________________ 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
_________________________________________ 
Classifying on the basis of the majority of responses resulted in 14 out of 32 logical 
responders, 14 pragmatic responders, and four participants who had equal numbers of upper 
and lower-bound responses. This latter group were removed from the analysis because they 
could not be classified. We also removed the minority “incorrect” responses from the logical 
and pragmatic groups. Average mouse trajectories for pragmatic responders in the false 
response conditions are shown in Figure 5. As before, AUCs for false responses to critical 
items differed significantly from true responses to critical items, t = 12.10, p < .001. In the 
analysis of Xneg, the pragmatic responders significantly deviated towards true at X_41, M = 
-.19, t1(13) = 4.22, p < 0.001, t2(29) = 6.77, p < 0.001. The logical responders did not deviate 
towards false when responding true, and none of the control conditions from either group 
had any negative coordinates. In short, the between-subject analysis leads to the same 
conclusion as the within-subject analysis. 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 examined average mouse trajectories for spontaneous lower-bound and 
upper-bound interpretations of critical sentences. The mouse paths for upper-bound 
responses were similar to those of Experiment 1, in which participants were trained to 
interpret these sentences one way or another. In both experiments mouse paths of the upper-
bound responses deviated towards the competitor response before completing their 
trajectories towards false, but the same pattern was not observed for the lower-bound 
responses. These results rule out the possibility that the nonmonotonic mouse paths seen in 
Experiment 1 were due to an artifact of the training procedure. Experiments 1 and 2 are 
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therefore consistent with participants accessing lower-bound meanings before upper-bound 
meanings, as predicted by two-step models.  
One explanation for our findings is that the initial attraction towards the true target 
might arise from a mismatch between the truth of the embedded proposition (elephants are 
mammals, true) and the truth of the quantified sentence (some elephants are mammals, false 
in the pragmatic condition). If participants delayed processing of the quantifier until after 
they had fully processed the embedded proposition, they could display initial deviations 
towards true in exactly the pattern that we observed. Delayed processing of the quantifier 
would be a sensible processing strategy within our task and in other, more naturalistic 
situations. Content words carry by far the most information in any conversational exchange 
and it makes sense for listeners to focus their attention on these components of the sentence. 
Furthermore, quantifiers need elements over which they quantify, and to some degree, 
people cannot fully interpret quantifiers until they know what it is that is being quantified. 
Although we did not observe delayed quantifier effects on any of our control sentences (see 
Bott & Noveck, 2004, for a similar point), it is conceivable that the propositions within these 
sentences were confounded by idiosyncratic factors that differentiate them from the critical 
sentences. In particular, the subject-predicate relationship was different in these control 
sentences (supercategory-exemplar) than it was in the some critical sentences (exemplar-
supercategory). We therefore designed Experiment 3 to test whether non-monotonic mouse 
paths would be observed with the sentences that involved the same form of embedded 
proposition as the critical sentences but used a different quantifier. 
Experiment 3 
In Experiment 3 we compared the critical sentences from Experiments 1 and 2 with 
sentences that used no as quantifier but involved the same embedded proposition, such as no 
elephants are mammals. These latter sentences constituted the no critical condition (see 
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Table 1 for a complete list of sentence types). All participants received upper-bound 
training, just as in the pragmatic condition of Experiment 1, so that the some critical 
sentences were false. The no quantifier reverses the truth of the embedded sentence, just as 
with the upper-bound interpretation of the some critical sentences, but it does not involve a 
scalar implicature. If the nonmonotonic mouse paths are due to the mismatch between 
sentence truth and embedded proposition, nonmonotonic mouse paths should also be 
observed with the comparable no sentences.  
Method 
Participants. Twenty-four undergraduate students from Cardiff University participated 
in exchange for cash payment. All were native speakers of English. 
Stimuli. Eight sentence types were used in Experiment 3 (see Table 1).  
Design. The experiment was a within participant design. All participants underwent a 
practice phrase of 100 items, which consisted of 10 all false items along with 12 some true 
items, 10 some false items, 20 some critical items, 12 all true items, 12 no critical items, 12 
no false items, and 12 no true items.  
The main experiment contained 206 trials. Of these, 176 were experimental trials and 
the remaining 30 were filler trials. The experimental trials involved counter-balanced items 
distributed equally across the eight conditions (22 trials per condition). Filler trials were 
included to counter-balance the high proportion of false responses in the rest of the design. 
The filler trials were all of the all true form but the items were novel and not rotated across 
the conditions of the experiment.   
Procedure. The experimental procedure was the same as the Experiment 1 pragmatic 
condition in that participants were trained to respond to some critical items as false.  
Results 
Preprocessing 
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We removed 1.3% of responses as outliers. A further 6% of responses were removed 
because they were incorrect. Table 4 shows the accuracy rates for all conditions. Less than 
1% of the responses had initiation times greater than 500ms.  
 _________________________________________ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
_________________________________________ 
Mouse tracking analysis 
Figures 6 and 7 show the average mouse trajectories for the false response conditions 
and true response conditions, respectively, collapsed across the counterbalanced right and 
left positions of the targets. The pattern for the some critical sentences is very similar to that 
in Experiment 1: Upper-bound responses deviate towards the true responses before arriving 
at false responses. Of principle interest for this experiment, however, were the no critical 
sentences. The average trajectory for these sentences does not look like the trajectory for the 
some critical sentences. Only the some critical sentences show deviation towards the 
competitor response; the no critical sentences push up the vertical axis initially, but when 
the trajectory deviates from the axis it heads for the target response, not the competitor 
response.  
_________________________________________ 
Insert Figures 6 & 7 about here 
_________________________________________ 
The AUC for each of the conditions is shown in Table 4. We analyzed AUC using a 
categorical fixed effect of sentence type with the eight levels shown in Figures 6 and 7, 
dummy coded with some critical sentences serving as the baseline reference category. 
Random effects were included for subjects and items. AUC was significantly greater for 
some critical than no critical sentences, t = 11.12, p < .001.  
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We further analyzed the x-coordinates to test for deviation into the competitor half of 
the trajectory. For the some critical sentences, the largest mean deviation occurred at time 
step X_40, M = -.23. A one sample t-test showed that this was significant for participants, 
t1(23) = 5.47, p < .001, and items, t2(21) = 10.21, p < .001. Conversely, the no critical 
sentences did not show any deviation into the competitor space.  
Two control conditions showed negative mean x-coordinates during part of the 
average response paths. First, the all false condition, shown in Figure 6, had a slight 
deviation towards true, the largest average deviation being at time step X_30, M = -.07. 
However, one-sample t-tests revealed the pattern was not significant, t1(23) = 1.65, p = .11, 
t2(21) = 1.75, p = .09.  The trend could reflect the result of having 30 extra all true items as 
fillers to counterbalance an otherwise overwhelming bias towards false responses across 
sentence types. Second, the no true conditions, such as no elephants are reptiles, also 
showed deviation away from the target. The largest average deviation was at time step 
X_46, M = -.30 and the one sample t-test shows that this was significant for both subjects, 
t1(23) = 7.42, p < 0.001, and items, t2(21) = 17.49, p < 0.001. We discuss this result below. 
Discussion 
Experiment 3 tested whether the nonmonotonic mouse paths in the some critical 
sentences were because the truth of the embedded proposition was different to the truth of 
the quantified sentence. We compared some critical sentences against other sentences that 
had the same incongruency between sentence truth and embedded proposition and the same 
exemplar-category relationship, but lacked the scalar implicature. These were sentences that 
involved no, as in no elephants are mammals. Whilst we replicated the nonmonotonic 
mouse paths for the some critical sentences, we did not find evidence of nonmonotonic paths 
for comparable no sentences, which would be expected if the effects we observed with some 
were due to an interference between sentence truth and embedded proposition.  
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Interestingly however, the no true sentences, such as no elephants are reptiles, showed 
significant deviations away from the target. Participants initially directed their mouse 
towards false, and then reversed the trajectory to click on true. Why was there a difference in 
mouse paths between the no true and the no critical sentences? We can think of several 
potential explanations. First, it is conceivable that initial deviations towards false were the 
result of a response bias for no sentences towards false (as with some sentences, twice as 
many no sentences were false compared to the number that were true). However, one would 
then also expect a response bias effect on some true sentences, but that is not what the data 
show. Below we suggest an alternative explanation based on the quantifier being partially 
delayed.  
We first consider two extreme versions of how participants might process quantifiers 
in our task. As discussed at the end of Experiment 2, it is possible that participants might 
initially bypass the quantifier completely, storing it in a buffer, and directly process the 
embedded proposition. After processing the proposition, they could return to derive the 
complete, quantified, sentence meaning. Given the results of the no critical sentences, 
however, this seems unlikely: if participants were evaluating the proposition first, we would 
have observed initial mouse paths towards true for these sentences. At the other extreme, 
participants, might process the proposition incrementally, starting with quantifier and then 
proceeding with the rest of the proposition, consistent with standard psycholinguistic 
theories about incremental language processing (e.g., Just & Carpenter, 1980). However, the 
mouse paths for the no true sentences argue against this. The initial deviation towards false 
suggests that, if anything, participants first analysed the embedded proposition, resulting in a 
false trajectory, and only later did participants integrate the quantifier and reverse the 
trajectory.  
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Between the previous two extreme processing accounts however, the possibility exists 
that the quantifier was partially processed prior to verifying the embedded proposition (see 
Urbach & Kutas, 2010, for a similar conclusion about quantifier processing). In the no 
conditions, participants could have stored the meaning of the quantifier no, then interpreted 
the proposition, before finally integrating the two after both had been processed. In the no 
critical condition, the negation and the true proposition would have been integrated without 
any difficulty, but in the no true condition, combining negation with the false proposition 
could have been problematic because of the “double negative” (see, e.g., Clark & Chase, 
1972). In the no critical condition, participants were able to quickly establish the sentence 
meaning and so did not deviate from the ideal trajectory. Because of the delay in integrating 
the quantifier and embedded proposition in the no true condition, however, participants 
initially directed their mouse towards the result of evaluating the embedded proposition 
during early stages of processing. This explanation is clearly posthoc and would require 
further experimentation to establish whether it is correct.  
Could partial processing of the quantifier explain the nonmonotonic mouse paths 
observed for upper-bound sentences? Even if quantifier processing was partially delayed, 
the results of the no critical condition reveal that the quantifier was not processed so late 
that true exemplar-category propositions exerted an early influence on the mouse paths. 
Since the embedded proposition in the no critical sentences was identical to that of the some 
critical sentences, and there was no double negation in the some critical sentences, it is 
implausible that the nonmonotonic mouse paths in the some critical sentences were due to 
excessively late processing of the quantifier.  
General Discussion 
Our goal in these experiments was to test between one- and two-step processing 
models of scalar implicatures. According to one-step models, the appropriate interpretation 
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is incorporated directly into the sentence representation. Differences in processing times 
between upper and lower-bound interpretations are assumed to result from extra complexity 
in upper-bound interpretations relative to lower-bound interpretations. In contrast, two-step 
models attribute differences in processing times to an extra processing step inherent in the 
derivation of implicatures. According to the two-step model, lower-bound literal 
interpretations are fundamental and are generated automatically. When needed, upper-bound 
interpretations are subsequently derived from the corresponding lower-bound 
interpretations. Across three experiments, we found that when participants made upper-
bound interpretations their mouse movements first deviated towards the lower-bound 
response option before targeting the upper-bound response option. In contrast, when 
participants made lower-bound interpretations their mouse movements went directly towards 
the target. In short, the results support a two-step model of implicature processing.  
Implications for models 
Our results suggest that participants interpret upper-bound meanings in two steps but 
lower-bound meanings in a single step. There are a variety of interpretations for what the 
steps might mean cognitively, however. We consider the results from the perspective of a 
classical Gricean account, Relevance (Sperber & Wilson, 1986), grammatical models of 
scalar implicatures as typified by Chierchia (2004, 2006; Chierchia, Fox & Spector, 2008), 
and constraint-based models of scalar implicatures. 
Gricean accounts. Our data are generally consistent with a direct implementation of 
the classical Gricean account of conversational implicature (1975). According to this view, 
when people derive upper-bound interpretations, they first decode the words and apply the 
normal rules of semantic composition to derive a coherent, literal sentence interpretation 
(Step 1). Next, appropriate components of the Cooperative Principle are considered, and the 
processor concludes that relevant alternatives to what the speaker said are presumed to be 
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false (Step 2). Applying this theory to our data, initial trajectories towards the true target for 
sentences such as some elephants are mammals correspond to an evaluation of the literal 
meaning of these sentences (Step 1), and the redirection towards false corresponds to the 
application of the Cooperative Principle and general reasoning, when the listener concludes 
in Step 2 that the implied claim some [but not all] elephants are mammals is false.  
Although a simple Gricean account is consistent with these data, it is not clear that it is 
sufficient as a cognitive processing model. The classical Gricean account assumes strict 
modularity and sequential processing (Step 2 cannot occur without the output of Step 1). 
This is somewhat counter to current conceptions of psycholinguistics that emphasize the 
incrementality of comprehension. Our data are certainly not compatible with a pure modular 
view that requires decisions to be complete before response motor action is initiated, 
because early deviation towards the competitor target indicates initiation of motor action 
before a final response decision (a similar point is made by Spivey, 2007). A less modular, 
more incremental possibility is that Step 2 processing could begin before the output of Step 
1 was completed. In that case, the use of pragmatic principles could be integrated into the 
process at a much earlier stage than a literal Gricean account would suggest. Future research 
needs to examine more precisely the point at which pragmatic enrichment begins. 
Relevance. According to Relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986), pragmatic 
understanding involves a process of representational enrichment following an initial 
decoding of the message’s conceptual content. The enrichment process is assumed to 
proceed incrementally until some criterion level of relevance is reached. From this 
perspective, scalar implicatures involve an initial decoding stage in which context-
independent (logical) meaning is retrieved, followed by an enrichment process that derives 
implicature (Carston, 1998; Noveck & Sperber, 2007). 
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Relevance could predict our data if the output of the enrichment process was slow to 
come online. Initial trajectories towards true might correspond to a stage in which the 
decoding process had been completed, but that the enrichment process was still under way. 
Initial decoding suggested a true judgment and it was only later, after the enrichment process 
had reached some threshold level, that mouse trajectories reversed and moved towards false. 
Of course, this account requires a specification of why the enrichment is delayed in its 
output. A Gricean account might assume that participants were computing alternatives, 
comparing the informativeness of those alternatives, and engaging in deductive inference -- 
all of which could be seen as time consuming processes -- but these are not the sorts of 
processes that are suggested by Relevance, and it is not clear what the alternatives are. 
Compositional accounts. An alternative approach to Relevance or the Gricean model 
is to consider scalar implicatures to be part of compositional semantics, rather than post-
compositional pragmatics (see Chierchia, 2004, 2006; Chierchia et al., 2008). According to 
this view an implicit only operator applies to the scalar term at the earliest possible 
opportunity, that is, during the compositional process. Such accounts propose that the only 
operator activates some pre-compiled set of operations to exclude stronger alternatives. Our 
results suggest that the only operator must be applied at a fairly late stage in the 
compositional process, so that an initial interpretation of the sentence is formed before the 
only operator is applied, driving initial mouse trajectories towards the true target before the 
only operator kicks in. Crucially, because the only operator is part of the composition 
process, this account requires emerging interpretations to be accessible throughout the 
composition process, or at least before composition is complete.  
Constraint-based models. The one-step model described in the Introduction was 
inspired by constraint-based and statistical models of language (e.g., Bates & MacWhinney, 
1989; MacDonald et al., 1994; Traxler, Pickering & Clifton,1998; van Gompel et al. 2005). 
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Although there are no detailed constraint-based theories of scalar-implicature in the 
literature, we considered it plausible that a model that uses only statistical and frequency-
based information might be able to predict when the not all inference arises and integrate 
this into the sentence representation. Crucially, such a model may not need standard Gricean 
pragmatic processes, such as computations of entailment relations, informativeness, and 
deduction. Nor would there be a need to represent maxims or rules of communication in the 
model – maxim-based behavior would be an emergent property of such a network. In this 
sense a constraint-based pragmatics model would be similar to connectionist models of 
English past tense that reproduce regularities in verb endings without explicit rules (e.g., 
Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986), or models that reproduce grammatical structure without an 
explicit representation of syntax (e.g., Elman, 1991). In our view the most straightforward 
prediction from such a model would be that the not all component of some would be 
incorporated directly into the sentence representation in a single step, and our experiments 
conflict with this prediction and therefore this type of model.  
Nonetheless, the one-step model may characterize only a very simple implementation 
of a constraint-based architecture. More complex constraint-based models, such as those 
seen in the syntactic processing literature, might be able to explain our data. One of the 
properties of constraint-based models that might prove important is their ability to consider 
multiple interpretations simultaneously. Moreover, constraint-based models of syntactic 
parsing often assume that multiple syntactic interpretations are kept active throughout 
sentence comprehension, even when some of them are unlikely (e.g., Elman, Hare & 
McRae, 2004; Farmer et al., 2007; MacDonald et al., 1994; McRae, Spivey-Knowlton and 
Tanenhaus, 1998; Tabor & Tanenhaus, 1999). For example, consider the garden path 
sentence, “the waiter served a steak enjoyed it immensely”. The sentence is temporarily 
ambiguous up until “enjoyed” because “served” could be treated as a main verb (the waiter 
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was serving) or as a past participle (the waiter was served). According to Farmer et al., when 
a sentence like this is parsed, both interpretations would be kept active throughout sentence 
comprehension even though activation of the main verb interpretation would be very low 
after “enjoyed”. Farmer et al. showed that individual-trial mouse trajectories responding to 
such sentences reflected the influence of both parsing options simultaneously (also see 
Spivey et al., 2005).  
Multiple active interpretations could potentially provide a kind of one-step account for 
the nonmonotonic mouse paths we observed, but only on the assumption that different 
sources of relevant information become available at different times (e.g., Elman et al., 2004; 
McRae et al, 1998). A constraint-based model in which information favoring the upper-
bound interpretation was delayed relative to information supporting the lower-bound 
interpretation could produce mouse trajectories that first headed towards the lower-bound 
response before changing direction as the relevant upper-bound information came online 
(rather like the Relevance model we suggest above). The delayed information might be 
consistent with elements of a Gricean model, such as the epistemic status of the speaker or 
the calculation of alternatives to what was said. However, such a model would not 
necessarily require the computation of a literal meaning prior to the pragmatic meaning, as 
in the classical Gricean account. We look forward to the development of testable constraint-
based models that implement such delays. 
Conclusion 
We view our research as making two major contributions to the understanding of 
scalar implicatures and language processing in general. First, from the point of previous 
research using underinformative sentences (e.g., Bott & Noveck, 2004; Bott et al., 2012; 
Feeney, Scrafton, Duckworth, & Handley, 2004; Noveck & Posada, 2003; Noveck, 2001; 
Pijnacker, Hagoort, Buitelaar, Teunisse, & Geurts, 2009), our studies reveal why upper-
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bound responses are delayed: participants judge underinformative sentences to be true prior 
to judging that they are false. The delay does not simply represent an extended period of 
indecision (e.g. because upper-bound responses require extra time to formulate more 
complicated sentence representations). Rather, participants initially formed an accessible but 
incorrect judgment about the truth of the sentence. Second, our results place constraints on 
models of how people derive implicatures: any model must predict that people have lower-
bound interpretations prior to the upper-bound. Models that compute and implement scalar 
implicatures in a single step are incompatible with this finding. 
 
References 
Baayen, R. H., Davidson, D. J. & Bates, D. M. (2008). Mixed-effects modeling with crossed 
random effects for subjects and items. Journal of Memory and Language, 59, 390-412. 
Bates, E. & MacWhinney, M. (1989). Functionalism and the competitive model. In B. 
MacWhinney & E. Bates (Eds.), The crosslinguistic study of sentence processing (pp. 3-
73). New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Bergen, L. & Grodner, D. J. (2012). Speaker knowledge influences the comprehension of 
pragmatic inferences. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & 
Cognition, 38, 1450-1460. 
Bott, L. & Noveck, I. A. (2004). Some utterances are underinformative: The onset and time 
course of scalar inferences. Journal of Memory and Language, 51, 437-457.  
Bott, L., Bailey, T. M., & Grodner, D. (2012). Distinguishing speed from accuracy in scalar 
implicatures. Journal of Memory & Language, 66, 123-142. 
Breheny, R., Katsos, N., & Williams, J. (2006). Are generalized scalar implicatures 
generated by default? An on-line investigation into the role of context in generating 
pragmatic inferences. Cognition, 100, 434-463.   
Scalar implicatures 39 
Carston, R. (1998). Informativeness, relevance and scalar implicature. In R. Carston & S. 
Uchida (eds.). Relevance Theory: Applications and implications (pp. 179-236). 
Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
Chierchia, G. (2004). Scalar implicatures, polarity phenomena, and the syntax/pragmatics 
interface. In A. Belletti (ed.), Structures and beyond, (pp. 39-103). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
Chierchia, G. (2006). Broaden your views: Implicatures of domain widening and the 
logicality of language. Linguistic Inquiry, 37, 535-590. 
Chierchia, G., Fox, D. & Spector, B. (2008). The grammatical view of scalar implicatures 
and the relationship between semantics and pragmatics. Handbook of Semantics. New 
York: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Clark, H. H. & Chase, W. G. (1972). On the process of comparing sentences against 
pictures. Cognitive Psychology, 3, 472-517. 
Dale, R., & Duran, N. D. (2011). The cognitive dynamics of negated sentence verification. 
Cognitive Science, 35, 983-996. 
Degen, J. & Tanenhaus, M. K. (2011). Making Inferences: The Case of Scalar Implicature 
Processing. In L. Carlson, C. Hölscher, & T. Shipley (Eds.), Proceedings of the 33rd 
Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 3299 - 3304). Austin, Texas: 
Cognitive Science Society. 
Duran, N. D., Dale, R. & McNamara, D. (2010). The action dynamics of overcoming the 
truth. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 17, 486-491. 
Elman, J. L. (1991). Distributed representations, simple recurrent networks, and 
grammatical structure. Machine Learning, 7, 195-225. 
Scalar implicatures 40 
Elman, J. L, Hare, M., & McRae, K. (2004). Cues, constraints, and competition in sentence 
processing. In M. Tomasello and D. Slobin (Eds.), Beyond Nature-Nature: Essays in 
Honor of Elizabeth Bates (pp. 111-138). Mahwah, NJ: Lawernce Erlbaum Associates. 
Farmer, T. Anderson, S., & Spivey, M. J. (2007). Gradiency and visual context in syntactic 
garden paths. Journal of Memory and Language, 57, 570-595.  
Feeney, A., Scrafton, S., Duckworth, A., & Handley, S. J. (2004). The story of some: 
Everyday pragmatic inferences by children and adults. Canadian Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 58, 121-132.  
Freeman, J. B., Ambady, N., Rule, N. O., & Johnson, K. L. (2008). Will a category cue 
attract you? Motor output reveals dynamic competition across person construal. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: General, 137, 673-690.  
Freeman, J. B. & Ambady, N. (2010). MouseTracker: Software for studying real-time 
mental processing using a computer mouse-tracking method. Behavior Research 
Methods, 42, 226-241. 
Freeman, J. B., Dale, R., & Farmer, T. A. (2011). Hand in motion reveals mind in motion. 
Frontiers in Psychology, 2, 59. 
Gazdar, G. (1979). Pragmatics: Implicature, Presupposition, and Logical Form. New York: 
Academic Press. 
Geurts, B. (2010). Quantity Implicatures. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In Cole, P., and Morgan, J., eds., Syntax and 
Semantics 3: Speech Acts (pp. 41–58). New York: Academic Press. 
Grice, H. P. (1989). Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Scalar implicatures 41 
Grodner, D., Gibson, E., & Watson, D. (2005). The influence of contextual contrast on 
syntactic processing: Evidence for strong interaction in sentence comprehension. 
Cognition, 95, 276-296.  
Grodner, D., Klein, N. M., Carbary, K. M., & Tanenhaus, M. K. (2010). ‘‘Some”, and 
possibly all, scalar inferences are not delayed: Evidence for immediate pragmatic 
enrichment. Cognition, 116, 42–55. 
Horn, L. R. (1972). On the semantic properties of logical operators in English. Ph.D. thesis, 
University of California, Los Angeles.  
Horn, L. R. (1989). A Natural History of Negation. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago 
Press.  
Horn, L. R. (2006). The border wars. In Klaus von Heusinger and Ken P. Turner, eds., 
Where Semantics Meets Pragmatics, (pp. 21–48). Oxford: Elsevier. 
Huang, Y. T. & Snedeker, J. (2009). On-line interpretation of scalar quantifiers: Insight into 
the semantic-pragmatics interface. Cognitive Psychology, 58, 376-415.  
Just, M. A., & Carpenter, P. A. (1980). A theory of reading - from eye fixations to 
comprehension. Psychological Review, 87, 329-354.  
Levinson, S. C. (2000). Presumptive meanings. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.  
MacDonald, M. C., Pearlmutter, N. J., & Seidenberg, M. S. (1994). The lexical nature of 
syntactic ambiguity resolution. Psychological Review, 101, 676-703. 
McRae, K., Spivey-Knowlton, M. J., Tanenhaus, M. K. (1998). Modeling thematic fit (and 
other constraints) within an integration competition framework. Journal of Memory and 
Language, 38, 283-312.  
McElree, B. (1993). The locus of lexical preference effects in sentence comprehension: A 
time-course analysis. Journal of Memory and Language, 32, 536–571. 
Scalar implicatures 42 
Noveck, I. (2001). When children are more logical than adults. Experimental investigations 
of scalar processing costs in implicature production. Cognition, 78, 165-188. 
Noveck, I. & Posada, A. (2003). Characterizing the time course of an implicature: an evoked 
potentials study. Brain and Language, 85, 203–210.  
Noveck, I. & Sperber, D. (2007). The why and how of experimental pragmatics: The case of 
scalar inferences. In N. Roberts, Advances in Pragmatics Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Pijnacker, J., Hagoort, P. Buitelaar, J., Teunisse, J., & Geurts, B. (2009). Pragmatic 
inferences in high-functioning adults with autism and Asperger syndrome. Journal of 
Autism and Developmental Disorders, 39, 607-618.  
Reed, A. V. (1973). Speed–accuracy trade-off in recognition memory. Science, 181, 574–
576.  
Rips, L. (1975). Quantification and semantic memory. Cognitive Psychology, 7, 307-340. 
Rumelhart, D.E., & McClelland, J.L. (1986). On learning the past tenses of English verbs. In 
D.E. Rumelhart, & J.L. McClelland (Eds.), Parallel distributed processing: Explorations 
in the microstructure of cognition (Vol. 1). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Sperber, D. & Wilson, D. (1986|1995). Relevance: Communication and Cognition. 2nd 
Edition. Oxford: Blackwell.    
Spivey, M., Grosjean, M., & Knoblich, G. (2005). Continuous attraction toward 
phonological competitors: Thinking with your hands. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 102, 10393-10398. 
Spivey, M. J. (2007). The Continuity of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press.  
Tabor, W. & Tanenhaus, M. K. (1999). Dynamical Models of Sentence Processing. 
Cognitive Science, 23(4), 491-515. 
Traxler, M. J., Pickering, M. J., & Clifton, C., Jr. (1998). Adjunct attachment is not a form 
of lexical ambiguity resolution. Journal of Memory and Language, 39, 558-592.
Scalar implicatures 43 
Urbach, T. P., & Kutas, M. (2010). Quantifiers more or less quantify on-line: ERP evidence 
for partial incremental interpretation. Journal of Memory and Language, 63(2), 158-179.  
van Gompel, R. P. G., Pickering, M. J., Pearson, J., & Liversedge, S. P. (2005). Evidence 
against competition during syntactic ambiguity resolution. Journal of Memory and 
Language, 52, 284-307. 
Acknowledgements 
This work was funded by ESRC Award RES-062-23-2410 to L Bott, TM Bailey & D 
Grodner. 
 
  
Scalar implicatures 44 
Table 1. 
Experimental stimuli 
 Name Example True/False 
Experiments 1, 2 & 3 Some critical Some elephants are mammals Exp 
All true All elephants are mammals T 
All false All elephants are insects F 
Some true Some mammals are elephants T 
Some false Some elephants are insects F 
Experiment 1 only Some subordinate 
true 
Some elephants are Indian T 
Experiment 2 only All super false All mammals are elephants F 
Experiment 3 only No critical No elephants are mammals F 
No true No elephants are insects T 
No false No elephants are Indian F 
Notes: All three experiments used sentences in rows 1 to 5. Individual experiments 
additionally used sentences from the appropriate rows. Exp refers to the experimental 
sentence, which could be either true or false.  
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Table 2 
Experiment 1: Mean Area Under the Curve (AUC), Accuracy, and Reaction Time (RT) for 
Logical and Pragmatic Conditions 
 Logical Pragmatic 
Sentence Type AUC 
M(SD) 
Accuracy RT 
M(SD) 
AUC 
M(SD) 
Accuracy RT 
M(SD) 
All true 0.30 (.84) 97% 860(312) 0.71 (1.25) 96% 1035(404) 
All false 0.84 (1.22) 98% 979(350) 0.37 (1.22) 98% 949(322) 
Some true 0.34 (0.92) 98% 876(322) 0.91 (1.41) 94% 1006(442) 
Some false 0.84 (1.18) 97% 975(326) 0.32 (0.83) 98% 947(307) 
Some subordinate 
true 
1.16 (1.25) 95% 1007(363) 1.44 (1.61) 96% 1092(390) 
Some critical2 0.25 (0.8) 97% 856(320) 2.26 (1.48) 87% 1295(426) 
Notes: 1n=30 items per sentence type. 2True in logical condition, false in pragmatic 
condition. 
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Table 3 
Experiment 2: Mean Area Under the Curve (AUC), Accuracy, and Reaction Time (RT) 
Sentence Type1 AUC 
M(SD) 
Accuracy RT 
M(SD) 
All true 0.84 (1.47) 93% 1055(508) 
All false 0.29 (.79) 99% 946(333) 
All super false 1.09 (1.55) 92% 1141(484) 
Some true 0.80 (1.44) 95% 1131(493) 
Some false 0.33 (.91) 98% 975(368) 
Some critical (True responses) 0.84 (1.45) 41% 1060(518) 
(False responses) 1.89 (1.78) 59% 1260(533) 
Notes: 1n=30 items per sentence type. 
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Table 4.  
Experiment 3: Mean Area Under the Curve (AUC), Accuracy, and Reaction Time (RT) 
Sentence Type1 AUC M(SD) Accuracy RT M(SD) 
All true 0.67(1.39) 94% 1070(390) 
All false 1.28 (1.47) 92% 930(380) 
Some true 1.32(1.40) 90% 1034(390) 
Some false 0.57(1.13) 97% 943(328) 
Some critical (False) 2.08(1.88) 78% 1188(423) 
No critical (False) 1.02(1.46) 93% 1154(508) 
No true 2.34(1.60) 93% 1241(437) 
No false 1.47(1.32) 95% 1150(417) 
Notes: 1n=22 items per sentence type, plus 30 all true filler trials (not analyzed). 
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Figures 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Idealized mouse tracks for easy and hard one-step processes compared to a two-
step process. The easy one-step trajectory (solid line) has a direct path towards the target 
response and does not enter into the competitor mouse space. This path will have low AUC 
(area under the curve) and low Xneg (deviation from the medial axis towards the competitor, 
FOIL). The hard one-step trajectory (light dotted line) pushes up the medial axis before 
veering towards the response (a so-called “T” motion). The AUC is correspondingly large, 
but because the mouse path barely crosses over into the competitor space, the Xneg is very 
small. Finally, the two-step path (dot-dashed) initially deviates towards the foil, but then 
returns to the response. The path is indirect and therefore has a high AUC, but because the 
path deviates into the competitor space it also has a high Xneg. 
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Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. Average mouse trajectories in Experiment 1 for the logical condition. Data points 
represent the average X and Y positions at each of 101 time steps.  
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Figure 3.   
 
Figure 3. Average mouse trajectories in Experiment 1 for the pragmatic condition. Data 
points represent the average X and Y positions at each of 101 time steps.  
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Figure 4.  
 
 
Figure 4. Average mouse trajectories in Experiment 2. Data points represent the average X 
and Y positions at each of 101 time steps. Diagonal crosses to false correspond to upper-
bound interpretations of the critical sentences and vertical crosses to true correspond to 
lower-bound interpretations. 
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 Figure 5
 
Figure 5. Average mouse trajectories in Experiment 2 of the pragmatic responders for the 
false conditions. Data points represent the average X and Y positions at each of 101 time 
steps.  
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Figure 6 
 
 
Figure 6. Average mouse trajectories in Experiment 3 for the false response conditions. Data 
points represent the average X and Y positions at each of 101 time steps.  
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Figure 7 
 
Figure 7. Average mouse trajectories in Experiment 3 for the true response conditions. Data 
points represent the average X and Y positions at each of 101 time steps.  
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Appendix 1 
Categories and exemplars used in Experiments 1-3 
Exemplar       Category Non-category   Sub-category 
pigeons 
ferries 
novels 
skyscrapers 
Ferraris 
tigers 
shirts 
labradors 
poodles 
beers 
wines 
sharks 
cod 
roses 
strawberries 
apples 
beds 
cockroaches 
elephants 
snakes 
lizards 
rats 
birds 
boats 
books 
buildings 
cars 
cats 
clothes 
dogs 
dogs 
drinks 
drinks 
fish 
fish 
flowers 
fruit 
fruit 
furniture 
insects 
mammals 
reptiles 
reptiles 
rodents 
stones 
mammals 
buildings 
rodents 
clothes 
fish 
stones 
drinks 
vegetables 
snakes 
buildings 
drinks 
vehicles 
books 
flowers 
vehicles 
dogs 
flowers 
cars 
birds 
shellfish 
pens 
woodpigeons 
P&O 
paperbacks 
rectangular 
convertibles 
Indian 
cotton 
black 
shaved 
lagers 
reds 
fierce 
smoked 
red 
wild 
Coxes 
wooden 
German 
Indian 
pythons 
chameleons 
black 
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lobsters 
vipers 
diamonds 
screwdrivers 
elms 
broccolis 
airplanes 
guns 
 
shellfish 
snakes 
stones 
tools 
trees 
vegetables 
vehicles 
weapons 
 
cars 
pens 
rodents 
books 
snakes 
stones 
boats 
cars 
 
farmed 
poisonous 
artificial 
electric 
Dutch 
purple 
Boeings 
automatic 
 
Note. The stimuli were constructed as subject predicate sentences according to the sentence 
types specified in the Methods sections.  
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Appendix 2 
Table A2.1. 
Experiment 1: Mean X-Coordinates for Logical and Pragmatic Conditions across 
Normalized Time Bins Coordinates 
Condition and 
sentence type 
Bin 1 (1-25) 
M(SD) 
Bin 2 (25-50) 
M(SD) 
Bin 3 (50-75) 
M(SD) 
Bin 4 (75-101) 
M(SD) 
Logical     
All true -0.07 (.17) -0.39 (.22) -0.72 (.22) -0.82 (.09) 
All false -0.06 (.16) 0.05 (.19) 0.60 (.35) 0.83 (.08) 
Some true -0.05 (.14) -0.34 (.26) -0.71 (.31) -0.84 (.08) 
Some super true -0.04 (.14) -0.14 (.28) -0.57 (.33) -.084 (.08) 
Some false -0.06 (.16) 0.18 (.30) 0.62 (.33) 0.83 (.08) 
Some critical -0.07 (.14) -0.39 (.24) -0.73 (.34) -0.83 (.08) 
Pragmatic     
All true -0.06 (.14) -0.23 (.26) -0.61 (.34) -0.83 (.1) 
All false 0.03 (.11) 0.30 (.21) 0.66 (.29) 0.82 (.09) 
Some super true 0.04 (.14) 0.02 (.37) -0.48 (.36) -.81 (.16) 
Some true 0.05 (.13) -0.24 (.21) -0.50 (.41) -0.81 (.1) 
Some false -0.03 (.12) 0.32 (.23) 0.67 (.26) 0.83 (.08) 
Some Critical -0.04 (.18) -0.22 (.32) 0.16 (.43) 0.79 (.13) 
Note: Negative values indicate movement towards the true target, and positive values 
indicate movement towards the false target. 
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Table A2.2. 
Experiment 2: Mean X-Coordinates across Normalized Time Bins Coordinates 
Conditions Bin 1(1-25) 
M(SD) 
Bin 2 (26-50) 
M(SD) 
Bin 3 (51-75) 
M(SD) 
Bin 4 (76-101) 
M(SD) 
All true -0.01 (.17) -0.18 (.34) -0.55(.43) -0.80(.13) 
All false 0.001 (.13) 0.25(.32) 0.69(.34) 0.83(.12) 
All super false 0.01 (.16) 0.04(.33) 0.41(.48) 0.79(.08) 
Some true -0.02 (.15) -.015(.33) -0.54(.41) -0.8(.11) 
Some false 0.01(.12) 0.24(.32) 0.64(.44) 0.77(.19) 
Some critical 
(True responses) 
-0.04(.17) -0.25 (.34) -0.57(.39) -0.8(.12) 
Some critical 
(False responses) 
-0.03(.19) -0.18 (.38) 0.21(.53) 0.78(.17) 
Note: Negative values indicate movement towards the true target, and positive values 
indicate movement towards the false target. 
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Table A2.3. 
Experiment 3: Mean X-Coordinates across Normalized Time Bins 
Conditions Bin 1(1-25) 
M(SD) 
Bin 2 (26-50) 
M(SD) 
Bin 3 (51-75) 
M(SD) 
Bin 4 (76-101) 
M(SD) 
All false -0.03 (.2) -0.03 (.45) 0.39 (.48) 0.8 (.13) 
All true -0.04 (.17) -0.25 (.42) -0.6 (.38) -0.81 (.11) 
No critical 0.01 (.2) 0.06 (.42) 0.37 (.45) 0.8 (.13) 
No false 0.0 (.18) 0.11 (.42) 0.47 (.45) 0.8(.12) 
No true 0.03(.19) 0.19(.24) -0.13(.5) -0.8(.12) 
Some true 0.0 (.18) -0.07(.41) -0.5(.39) -.81(.11) 
Some critical -0.03(.22) -0.2(.36) 0.23(.52) 0.79(.15) 
Some false -0.01(.17) 0.16(.35) 0.61(.33) 0.83(.11) 
Note: Negative values indicate movement towards the true target, and positive values 
indicate movement towards the false target. 
